

SECRET - EXDISSALT TWO  
SESSION I  
A-97MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
U.S. SALT DELEGATION  
GENEVA, SWITZERLANDDATE: December 15, 1972  
TIME: 12:00 to 12:45 p.m.  
PLACE: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Dr. Edward M. Ifft

Mr. O. A. Grinevsky

SCC

Mr. Grinevsky said he understood the U.S. had some problem with the draft SCC charter. I replied that we were hoping to hear from Washington soon on that subject. I asked if the Soviet side was ready to sign the draft, but Grinevsky was evasive, saying there was a question regarding which documents were to be signed. I did not pursue the subject.

Restraint

I asked Grinevsky whether the Soviet Delegation would have anything further to say on the subject of restraint. I said that I still had only a vague notion of what the Soviets had in mind. Thus far, only U.S. programs had been mentioned. Some indication of what restraints the Soviet side was willing to accept for itself would help to clarify whether or not the proposal was a serious one. Grinevsky said that the Soviet Delegation might give some specifics (it was not clear whether he meant in this session or later), but it also might decide to keep the concept more general. He recalled that the latter approach had been more productive in negotiating the NPT. He acknowledged that the Soviet side had only referred to U.S. systems in its statements on restraint. He said he was waiting for the U.S. to bring up some specific Soviet programs. After such an "exchange of blows", perhaps we could get on with meaningful negotiations. He was not saying that such an exchange of blows was necessarily required, but that was one way to proceed.

Grinevsky then emphasized that he wished to make one point clear. The Soviets were not proposing unilateral restraint by the U.S. They did not have in mind restraints on Trident and B-1, for example, with no corresponding restraints on Soviet systems. I replied that I had noted their December 12 statement that restraint would be mutual, but, in the absence of specifics, it remained a difficult concept to handle.

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I asked whether the Soviets viewed restraint solely in terms of forgoing certain new programs or whether a slowdown in new programs might also be involved. Grinevsky replied that both concepts were of interest.

FBS

We briefly exchanged standard arguments on FBS. I asked whether Soviet concerns involved primarily potential future FBS capabilities rather than current ones. Grinevsky replied that both were of concern. When I said that the Soviet proposals on FBS were extreme and could not be expected to receive serious consideration, Grinevsky did not disagree, but said that the U.S. FBS position was also an extreme one. I replied that a careful reading of U.S. statements would not support such an allegation. He said that while he saw a faint glimmer of hope, the U.S. position was so "shaky" that there was little cause for optimism. The sides seem to be deadlocked and a solution which "takes into account" FBS must be found. If the U.S. side would even say that it was willing to discuss the subject, that would have a positive effect. I said that I understood his point, but did not comment further.

Aggregates

Grinevsky at first vigorously denied my claim that the Soviets had once agreed to the concept of equal aggregates of the central systems. After some discussion, we reached agreement that this had once been the Soviet position, with the proviso that FBS be "taken into account".

I said that the Soviets must understand that the U.S. opposes an approach which calls the ICBM/SLBM levels in the Interim Agreement "fair" and then sets out to set separate "fair" levels for bombers. This is not what both sides had in mind in negotiating the Interim Agreement. I also recalled Soviet opposition to our 4-1, 3-1, and 2-1 proposals for ABM's. Grinevsky replied that the U.S. team in Moscow in May must have taken these political considerations into account when they negotiated the Interim Agreement. Furthermore, it was the U.S. which pushed for a longer lifetime in Article VIII of the Interim Agreement--the Soviet side had proposed a lifetime of one or two years. I acknowledged the point, but said that there were rather complicated considerations involved with respect to that question and it was clear that the U.S. never intended the Interim Agreement to play the role in which the Soviets were now casting it. Grinevsky nodded and did not pursue the point.

Destruction/Dismantling/Replacement Procedures

Throughout the conversation, Grinevsky repeatedly asked that the U.S. address in this session the details of destruction, dismantling and replacement procedures. I said that we did not plan to do so. Our position was that the SCC could negotiate these details in its initial meetings. I pointed out that we had just

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presented some guidelines which gave a good indication of U.S. thinking on this question. I thought these guidelines represented a "common-sense" approach to the question and should be acceptable to the Soviet side. Grinevsky said he had heard nothing startling in the new guidelines, although he would need to study them more carefully. Nevertheless, he feared that a "gap" was developing in the approaches of the two sides to this question. I replied that I was not aware of any gap. After Grinevsky had repeated his concern for the third or fourth time, I said that there evidently must indeed be a problem looming up before us which he saw based upon his knowledge of studies underway in Moscow. I observed that if the SCC became seriously deadlocked on its very first issue, that would not be a healthy situation. Grinevsky agreed. He said that assigning the issue to the SCC did not preclude discussing it between delegations, and again urged that the U.S. Delegation provide whatever details it could on its proposed procedures before leaving Geneva.

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